Recently, Zhou Hao, a researcher at the China Institute of Regulation Research and the China Institute of Regulation Research and Public Policy (CRTT), published a paper entitled Optimal Mechanism Design with Referral in Management Science, a top international journal in management. The paper was published with ZUFE listed as the first affiliation.

Abstract: This paper establishes the optimal selling mechanism when a seller can incentivize an existing buyer to refer his privately known potential buyer to participate. We identify three optimal channels for providing referral incentives. First, if the existing buyer declares that no potential buyer exists, his virtual value is penalized. Second, if the existing buyer refers the potential buyer to the seller, his virtual value is boosted. Third, in some scenarios where this carrots-and-sticks-via-virtual-value approach is insufficient for creating proper referral incentives, the existing buyer is then given a constant referral bonus for referring the potential buyer. We also provide conditions under which the optimal mechanism can be implemented using simple mechanisms. Finally, we demonstrate that the conventional resale mechanism is suboptimal.

Founded in 1954 by the Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS), Management Science encompasses a wide range of research topics related to management, including operations research, finance, information technology, and organization. It is listed in the University of Texas at Dallas Top 24 Journals (UTD24) and the Financial Times Top 50 (FT50). In China, Management Science is recognized as a top international journal in Management Science and Engineering, and often listed in the high-level journal directories of universities and research institutes.